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Abstract
Background: It is now a decade since the World Trade Organization (WTO) adopted the ‘‘Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health’’ at its 4th Ministerial Conference in Doha. Many anticipated that these actions would lead
nations to claim compulsory licenses (CLs) for pharmaceutical products with greater regularity. A CL is the use of a patented
innovation that has been licensed by a state without the permission of the patent title holder. Skeptics doubted that many
CLs would occur, given political pressure against CL activity and continued health system weakness in poor countries. The
subsequent decade has seen little systematic assessment of the Doha Declaration’s impact.
Methods and Findings: We assembled a database of all episodes in which a CL was publically entertained or announced by
a WTO member state since 1995. Broad searches of CL activity were conducted using media, academic, and legal databases,
yielding 34 potential CL episodes in 26 countries. Country- and product-specific searches were used to verify government
participation, resulting in a final database of 24 verified CLs in 17 nations. We coded CL episodes in terms of outcome,
national income, and disease group over three distinct periods of CL activity. Most CL episodes occurred between 2003 and
2005, involved drugs for HIV/AIDS, and occurred in upper-middle-income countries (UMICs). Aside from HIV/AIDS, few CL
episodes involved communicable disease, and none occurred in least-developed or low-income countries.
Conclusions: Given skepticism about the Doha Declaration’s likely impact, we note the relatively high occurrence of CLs, yet
CL activity has diminished markedly since 2006. While UMICs have high CL activity and strong incentives to use CLs
compared to other countries, we note considerable countervailing pressures against CL use even in UMICs. We conclude
that there is a low probability of continued CL activity. We highlight the need for further systematic evaluation of global
health governance actions.
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It is now a decade since the World Trade Organization (WTO)
adopted the ‘‘Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health’’ at its 4th Ministerial Conference in Doha. The Doha
Declaration reaffirmed the right of WTO member states to apply
the legal flexibility of compulsory licensing—which is a state
licensing the use of a patented innovation without the permission
of the patent title holder—to pharmaceutical patents under the
WTO’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS)
Agreement [1]. It also led the TRIPS Council to announce a
waiver allowing states lacking strong drug production capacity to
import generics under compulsory licensing [2]. Many anticipated
that these actions would lead nations to claim compulsory licenses
(CLs) with greater regularity, beginning with medicines for HIV/
AIDS and extending into other conditions [3,4]. Skeptics,
however, doubted that many CLs would occur, given persistent
political pressure against CL activity and continued health system
weaknesses in poor countries [5].
The TRIPS Agreement and Doha Declaration
The TRIPS Agreement was among the founding documents
adopted by member states upon the formation of the WTO in
1995. TRIPS set out to establish a common global standard for the
protection of intellectual property rights, including patents [6].
The emergence of common levels of patent protection among
nations necessitated a common approach to CLs. The CL
safeguard is a common feature of domestic intellectual property
law and is relevant to a variety of industries [7,8]. TRIPS Article
31 recognized the right of member states to invoke CLs, but it also
sought to limit CL action by requiring a period of negotiation
between the member state and the patent holder unless, as noted
in subparagraph (b), it is a ‘‘case of a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency.’’ Such negotiations create
space for outcomes short of an actual CL, including negotiated
voluntary licenses (VLs), price reduction, donation of the branded
product, or a capitulation by the member state. Subparagraph (f)
further limited CLs to the supply of the domestic market,
eliminating the possibility of countries with low production
capacity claiming a CL for drugs imported from another member
state [9,10].
TRIPS included transitional provisions for poor nations. Least-
developed countries (LDCs), an official WTO grouping, were
given a deadline for full TRIPS compliance in 2006. WTO
‘‘developing country’’ status is based on self-identification and
includes most countries classified as low or upper-middle income
by the World Bank [11]. Developing countries originally agreed to
a full compliance deadline of 2000, but nations that did not
previously recognize pharmaceutical product patents were given
until 2005 to recognize them [12].
Article 31 became a subject of a public controversy relating to
public health that peaked in 2001. At the height of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic, US trade officials objected to drug licensing practices in
South Africa and especially Brazil, against whom the US filed a
complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (which it later
withdrew) [13]. Yet, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks
in the US, the US Department of Health and Human Services
publicly revisited its own CL policy in response to fears of a
shortage of Bayer’s ciprofloxacin (Cipro) and subsequently secured
a significant discount, giving the appearance of a US double
standard [14,15]. WTO members, especially the African Group,
agreed that clarification was needed, and the TRIPS Agreement’s
flexibilities in connection with health were added to the agenda of
the WTO’s 4th Ministerial Conference at Doha in November
2001 [16,17].
Adopted on 14 November 2001, the ‘‘Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health’’ opened with the following
words: ‘‘We recognize the gravity of the public health problems
afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, espe-
cially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and
other epidemics.’’ It went on to support ‘‘WTO members’ right to
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all’’ [1]. Three separate paragraphs had specific
implications for the pace of CL activity from 2001 forward.
Paragraph (Par.) 5 reaffirmed Article 31, recognizing the
authority of member states to grant CLs, to determine the
grounds for CLs, to ‘‘determine what constitutes a national
emergency,’’ and to define its own licensing regime without
challenge. While Par. 5 did not constitute a policy change, it
potentially offered a strong signal of the acceptability of
pharmaceutical CLs.
Par. 6 sought to address the production capacity issue by
charging the TRIPS Council with finding a ‘‘solution’’ for
members with ‘‘insufficient or no manufacturing capabilities’’ to
supply their domestic market. On 30 August 2003, the TRIPS
Council responded with a waiver that allowed pharmaceutical-
producing nations to issue a CL for the export of pharmaceutical
products to nations with insufficient pharmaceutical production
capabilities [2]. On 6 December 2005, the council announced its
intention to make the 30 August 2003 waiver a permanent
amendment [18]. The amendment has not yet been approved by
the required two-thirds of member states; the deadline for
ratification has been extended twice and is due to expire again
at the end of 2011 [19]. Such third-party licensing became known
as the Par. 6 system, and opened up the opportunity for export
CLs beginning in 2003. Significant effort has been put forth to
encourage member states to use the Par. 6 system to improve
pharmaceutical access, including six WTO workshops and two
World Health Organization (WHO)/WTO/World Intellectual
Property Organization joint technical symposia [20].
Finally, Par. 7 stated an intention to extend the TRIPS
compliance deadline for LDCs to 2016, a change officially put into
effect by the TRIPS Council on 27 April 2002 [10]. In principle,
this extension could make CLs irrelevant to LDCs. Yet in practice
a great many LDCs accelerated their compliance timelines well
ahead of 2016, particularly since most were preparing for a 2006
deadline. In 2004, Attaran [5] noted that 28 of the 30 the least-
developed African countries had already adopted patent laws.
Similarly, while the developing country transition window might
have delayed CL activity until 2005, many developing countries
were already compliant by 2000 [10].
Theorized Impacts of the Doha Declaration on CL Activity
While the words of the Doha Declaration and the waiver point
to the likelihood of increased CL activity, skeptics highlighted
reasons to expect a more limited impact. Some emphasized
barriers to the use of CLs. Many LDCs lack the production
capacity, distribution networks, or buying power required to
effectively use CLs [21,22]. Par. 6 addressed production capacity
but left importers dependent on willing exporters. Although Doha
may have legitimized CLs for some countries, CLs could
nonetheless provoke retaliatory actions including market with-
drawal by the producer, informal pressure from foreign trade
ministries, or formal action via the WTO [23].
Another set of skeptics argued that patents are not really the key
barrier to drug access in the developing world and thus CLs were
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WHO’s ‘‘Model List of Essential Drugs’’ [24] were developed
recently enough to be eligible for patent. Even among newer
drugs, many were not patented in countries with no local market
to protect and little risk of generic production. Overall, a patent
existed in only 1.4% of drug–country combinations. One
important exception was antiretroviral drugs (ARVs), which
constituted the majority of medicines that were both essential
and patented [5].
The past decade has seen progress in increasing pharmaceutical
access in the poorest countries, particularly with the global
antiretroviral treatment scale-up, yet such improvements also
relate to increased philanthropic activity, public–private partner-
ships, and bilateral aid. No study to our knowledge has measured
the Doha Declaration’s impact on the actual occurrence of CLs,
and there have been relatively few systematic assessments of the
Doha Declaration’s impact [23,25,26]. While a small number of
CL case registries have been constructed, these were developed for
advocacy purposes and have not been subject to peer review
[8,27–29]. There is thus a need for a systematic analysis of CL
activity.
To address this gap, we assembled a systematic database of all
episodes in which a CL was either publically entertained by
government officials or actually declared since the TRIPS
Agreement was signed in 1995. Aside from the actual announce-
ment of a CL, a mere threat can have a powerful effect,
empowering developing nations to negotiate more aggressively
with pharmaceutical houses and possibly leading to drug discounts
or VLs.
Methods
In order to capture government involvement in episodes that fell
short of an actual CL, initial searches focused on media sources,
rather than official government sources. We constructed a
database of CL episodes meeting the following criteria: (i) the
nation was a WTO member state, and (ii) there was documented
evidence that the episode involved the active support of
government or public officials [30]. This second criterion was
essential as only nation-states have standing at the WTO and are
capable of issuing a CL.
The search began with the LexisNexis media archive, which
includes news items from more than 45,000 legal, news, and
business sources, and industry newsletters [31]. Search criteria
were broad—i.e., ‘‘(pharma! OR drug) AND (compulsory
licen!)’’—and generated 999 media reports of CL episodes as of
6 June 2011. Reports were reviewed manually to identify CL
episodes reflecting unique country–drug combinations. This
procedure was repeated using other news databases (e.g., Access
World News, World News Collection, Google News), academic
and legal databases (e.g., HeinOnline, ScienceDirect), and
archives of relevant international organizations and lobbies (e.g.,
WTO, World Intellectual Property Organization, WHO, Con-
sumer Project on Technology, Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America). These latter sources yielded no new
CL episodes, but provided further background. Finally, the
resulting list of CL episodes was cross-referenced against four
other CL collection efforts [8,27–29] as well as the designated
WTO website for Par. 6 system use notifications [32]. These
sources introduced no additional CL episodes.
Having compiled a list of 34 potential CL episodes in 26
countries, a subsequent verification step excluded episodes that
failed to meet the public health and government involvement
criteria. Searches of media, legal, academic, and industry sources
were generalized to cover all mentions of the country, drug, and
pharmaceutical producer together—e.g., ‘‘Ecuador Kaletra Ab-
bott license.’’ Site-restricted searches were conducted on pharma-
ceutical firms’ and government websites—e.g., ‘‘site:abbott.com
compulsory licen*.’’ One episode involving a non-WTO member
(Eritrea) was excluded. Three cases involved the negotiation of a
VL between a local producer and an international patent holder,
typically for export, with no government role (in South Korea,
Kenya, and India). Another six involved non-government
organization demands for a CL, with no evidence of government
support (in the Philippines, Mexico, Colombia, Indonesia, Guinea,
Cameroon, India, and Kenya).
The resulting database included 24 CL episodes in 17 nations,
involving 40 pharmaceutical product patents (not including two
CLs that were for all ARVs; see below). We provide a summary of
each case in Text S1. For each episode we systematically identified
the country, year(s), pharmaceutical product(s), and the patent
holder(s). Some case studies involved a CL on multiple drugs and
were difficult to consider as independent instances; therefore, we
bundled these into a single episode. Ghana and Zimbabwe issued
categorical CLs on all ARVs, making the exact number of affected
patents difficult to determine.
CL episodes were coded according to national income, disease
group, and the outcome of the episode. National income was
coded as low (including World Bank low and lower-middle
categories), upper-middle, or high using World Bank classifica-
tions. From the group of low-income countries (LICs), we
separated out countries recognized as LDCs by WTO. We thus
include four income categories: LDCs, LICs, upper-middle-
income countries (UMICs), and high-income countries (HICs),
Disease group was coded as HIV/AIDS, other communicable
disease (CD), or non-communicable disease (NCD) based on the
primary therapeutic use of the product.
Finally, four possible case study outcomes were coded: CL, VL,
discount (which would include donations), or none (meaning that
the CL threat was withdrawn). While these outcomes are
illustrative of the diversity of CL episodes, they do not imply
specific public health impacts. For example, drug donations could
save more lives than a CL, but only if the number of doses donated
was large. Where available, detailed data on price reductions and
doses obtained are reported in Text S1, but these data typically
come from unverified media sources. Health ministries, patent
holders, and local producers rarely disclose such data, particularly
in cases of discounts or VLs.
Results
General Trends and Relationships
Table 1 lists 24 unique international CL episodes from 1 January
1995 through 6 June 2011. These 24 episodes collectively involved
40 drug patents for 22 unique pharmaceutical products. Two
nationsappliedcategoricalCLsonallARVs.Yearsinparenthesesin
Table 1 indicate CL renewals, which we excluded from the overall
tally. Note that Text S1 lists the references for the data in Table 1
and for the results and trends discussion contained in this section.
We next highlight key characteristics of CL episodes with
respect to outcome, disease group, and national income (see
Figure 1). Half of all CL episodes covered in our database ended
specifically in the announcement of a CL (12 out of 24), but the
great majority ended in some kind of price reduction for the
potential issuing nation, whether via CL, VL, or discount. All of
the findings and patterns reported below hold, whether we look at
all episodes, episodes leading to any positive outcome, or only
episodes in which a CL was issued.
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involved HIV/AIDS (16 out of 24). Of the remainder, four
involved other CDs and four involved NCDs (note that one
instance in Thailand involved both HIV/AIDS and an NCD).
With respect to income group, a majority of CL episodes involved
UMICs (13 out of 24), with three episodes occurring in HICs, five
in LICs, and three in LDCs.
To better understand the trends visible in Table 1 and the
development of CL activity over time, we next classified the
episodes into three distinct periods of activity. We found no
evidence of CL activity between 1995 and 2000 (see Figure 2). The
first period of CL activity took place in the months before the 2001
Doha conference. This period included five CL episodes involving
three UMICs and two HICs. South Africa and Brazil both made
widely publicized policy changes and CL threats that resulted in
significant drug discounts and VLs. After the anthrax attacks in the
US in 2001, Canada issued a CL aimed at stockpiling medicines.
The US publicly reexamined its own CL policy and subsequently
obtained discounts on ciprofloxacin (Cipro) from Bayer. No nation
invoked a CL for NCD drugs during this time frame. The period
immediately following Doha saw only one CL. Egypt, an LIC,
issued a CL for the male erectile dysfunction drug sildenafil
(Viagra).
The period from 2003 to 2005 saw the greatest volume of CL
activity, especially for ARVs. Nearly half of all of the documented
CL episodes occurred in this period (11 of 24). ARVs accounted
for nine of the 11 episodes, including two categorical CLs on all
HIV/AIDS medicines. Although this spike in CL episodes
coincided with the 30 August 2003 export waiver decision, none
of these episodes were export CLs, and many of these episodes
preceded August 30. Taiwan and Argentina entertained CLs for
avian influenza medicines, receiving VLs in both cases. This
period also included the greatest variety of countries, including two
LDCs, three LICs, five UMICs, and one HIC.
The period from 2006 to June 2011 saw a substantial decline in
activity. There have been seven CLs entertained by four countries,
with six of the seven episodes involving UMICs. The current era is
dominated by the activities of Thailand. Thailand began with
HIV/AIDS but quickly became the most active issuer of CLs for
NCD drugs, including drugs for cardiovascular diseases and
cancer. India entertained a CL for the cancer drug imatinib
mesylate (Gleevec) in 2006, but didn’t issue a CL. Two other
nations issued CLs for ARVs. In 2007, Rwanda became the only
LIC to claim a CL for an imported drug when it bought
lamivudine/nevirapine/zidovudine (Apo-TriAvir) from Apotex, a
Canadian firm. This well-studied episode illustrated many pitfalls
in the existing Par. 6 system, including a variety of costly
bureaucratic delays and a price that was still higher than for
comparable Indian generics [33–35]. The current period has seen
no CLs relating to CDs other than HIV/AIDS.
Table 1. CL episodes by year and country.
Year(s) Nation
National Income
Group Disease Disease Group Total Products Outcome
2001 (2007) Brazil UMIC HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS 2 CL/discount
2001 Brazil UMIC HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS 1 Discount
2001 Canada HIC Anthrax CD 1 Discount
2001–2003 South Africa UMIC HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS 8 VL/discount/none
2001 United States HIC Anthrax CD 1 Discount
2002 Egypt LIC Erectile dysfunction NCD 1 CL
2003–2004 Malaysia UMIC HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS 3 CL
2003, 2007 Brazil UMIC HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS 1 Discount
2003 Zimbabwe LIC HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS All CL
2004 Mozambique LDC HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS 3 CL
2004 Zambia LDC HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS 3 CL
2005–2006 Argentina UMIC Pandemic flu CD 1 VL
2005–2007 Brazil UMIC HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS 1 Discount
2005–2009 Brazil UMIC HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS 1 Discount
2005 Ghana LIC HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS All CL
2005 Indonesia LIC HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS 2 CL
2005 Taiwan HIC Pandemic flu CD 1 VL
2006–2007 India LIC Cancer NCD 1 None
2006 (2010) Thailand UMIC HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS 1 CL
2007 Rwanda LDC HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS 1 CL
2007 (2010) Thailand UMIC HIV/AIDS, CVD HIV/AIDS, NCD 2 CL
2007–2008 Thailand UMIC Cancer NCD 1 Discount
2007–2008 Thailand UMIC Cancer NCD 3 CL
2010 Ecuador UMIC HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS 1 CL
Totals: 24 Episodes, 17 Nations, 40 Unique Drug-Nation Combinations +2 Categorical CLs. Years in parentheses indicate CL renewals.
CVD, cardiovascular disease.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001154.t001
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doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001154.g001
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Scrutinizing CL Activity in Low and Middle-Income
Countries
While the Doha Declaration and the ensuing waiver process
had many motivations and intended effects, those mentioned most
prominently in the actual text related to improving access to drugs
in poor countries, particularly for CD [1–3]. It is therefore striking
and perhaps controversial that we observe a higher level of CL
activity in UMICs than in LICs and LDCs. While the goal of this
study was not to compare rates or propensities to carry out CLs
across country groups, it is nonetheless worth considering whether
middle-income countries (MICs) are in fact more likely to carry
out CLs, and if so, why? We address some potential explanations.
Perhaps the infrequency of CLs by LDCs is an artifact of the
transition process, specifically Par. 7, which delayed the TRIPS
transition deadline for LDCs to 2016? If LDCs were not even
honoring patents through the study period, then we have clearly
not established an apples-to-apples comparison. Yet as we noted
above, most LDC members of WTO had actually implemented
TRIPS-compliant patent laws by 2004. Two LDCs, Mozambique
and Zambia, did in fact claim CLs in 2004, suggesting the CLs
were indeed a possibility in LDCs.
Perhaps a more compelling possibility is that LDCs simply had
alternative mechanisms for gaining access to drugs that were not
available to other countries. This is most relevant in the case of the
global ARV scale-up, in which Indian generics producers worked
closely with the Clinton Foundation and other non-government
organizations to export generic HIV/AIDS drugs developed prior
to 2005 (and thus not subject to patent in India) to HIV-affected
nations [36,37]. While India retained the right to export non-
patented antiretroviral treatments, by the end of the developing
country transition period, only LDCs whose patent transition
windows had been extended to 2016 would have been allowed to
import such medicines. This again could cast some doubt on the
comparability of the CL environment across country income
categories. We note, however, that this mechanism would only
affect our results with respect to HIV/AIDS, the disease which
actually saw the greatest CL activity. We found no evidence of this
export practice for drugs related to any other diseases.
We thus argue that there was indeed a low propensity to carry
out CLs among LDCs and LICs, and that our finding is not a
mere artifact of Doha Declaration transition periods. Our data
cannot, however, distinguish between a low rate of CL activity for
drugs that were patented or simply a low propensity for many
products to be patented in the first place, as was found in research
based on the pre–Doha Declaration period [5]. Yet either
explanation would support a similar interpretation, that CLs have
little direct relevance to poor countries. Producers send a powerful
signal of the threat of generic production or distribution of drugs in
a country when they choose not to patent a drug at all. Future
studies could assess whether the Doha Declaration has had any
impact on subsequent patenting behaviors of pharmaceutical
companies.
Most CL activity, including all activity since mid-2007, took
place in UMICs, a phenomenon we interpret in terms of
economic, epidemiologic, and health system transitions. Rela-
tive to LICs, UMICs have the production and distribution
capacity to carry out CLs. UMICs may also have the weight
within the political economic system to withstand political
pressure and threats of retaliatory action. Demand for CLs is
further explained by the epidemiologic transition, as the shift
from CDs to NCDs being the leading cause of morbidity
induces a rise in pharmaceutical unit costs and treatment
durations [38]. Whereas HICs have well-developed systems for
discovery of advanced medicines and reimbursing patients for
the use of costly medicines, these systems may be nascent in
many UMICs [39].
The impetus for CL activity may be particularly high in UMICs
facing a double burden of disease involving HIV/AIDS. First,
HIV/AIDS places additional financial burdens on health systems
that create a need to cut costs elsewhere. Second, HIV/AIDS
familiarizes health systems with the costs and burdens of long-term
palliative care. Finally, HIV/AIDS patients themselves can
experience an extraordinarily high rate of NCD. This could
explain the progression that was seen in CLs issued by Thailand:
HIV/AIDS CLs in 2006, CLs for the blood thinner clopidogrel
bisulfate (Plavix) and the AIDS medication lopinavir/ritonavir
(Kaletra) in January 2007, followed by CLs for cancer medicines in
2007 and 2008.
Figure 2. Classification of CL episodes by time period and national income group.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001154.g002
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Almost ten years after the Doha Declaration, we examined the
subsequent occurrence of CL episodes, an important direct
indicator of treaty impact. We found evidence of a modest
number of pharmaceutical CL episodes, especially when consid-
ering threatened CLs as well as CLs actually issued. Most episodes
were related to the drugs for HIV/AIDS. These episodes occurred
not immediately after the Doha Declaration, but in a period
between 2003 and 2005. It is beyond the scope of this work to
ascertain whether this lagged spike resulted from the Doha
Declaration itself, from the global ARV advocacy campaign, or
from a combination of the two. Either way, the occurrence of so
many CLs, even among countries that were technically exempted
from full TRIPS compliance until 2016, suggests that CLs had
achieved increased legitimacy as a health action, particularly given
that no CLs were declared before 2001. Yet just as notable is the
marked decrease in CL activity from 2006 forward. Future
research should validate this apparent decline and assess possible
explanations.
While CLs are available to all nations, the rhetoric preceding
the Doha Declaration and the language of the declaration itself
emphasized the need to increase pharmaceutical access in poor
countries facing high rates of CD. We found few instances of CLs
for CDs other than HIV/AIDS, and these few related to potential
pandemic diseases (influenza, anthrax) in rich countries. We found
no CLs for high-impact diseases with patented treatments such as
malaria, multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis, or sepsis. After the Par.
6 export waiver policy, we observed just one export CL, a case
involving Canada and Rwanda that demonstrated many of the
obstacles inherent in the export waiver system. We thus conclude
that the barriers to CL use in LDCs and LICs go well beyond the
lack of production capacity, and likely extend to health system
incapacity, political pressure against CLs, and the legislative
difficulties of issuing a CL.
Instead, a majority of CL activity occurred within UMICs,
including a number of episodes involving drugs for NCDs. Given
the opportunities and incentives for UMICs to employ CLs, we
may ask why MICs have not rushed to issue CLs on a far wider
range of medicines. In fact, MICs face considerable pressure from
internal industrial lobbies and foreign governments to honor
intellectual property rights [23]. Patent recognition may also be
seen as an opportunity to attract foreign investment and
technology transfer. Many regional or bilateral trade agreements
now include so-called TRIPS-plus provisions that expand patent
rights or limit generic production capacity [23]. While UMICs
may be the group most likely to employ CLs, even they may be
quite unlikely to do so under existing rules.
Given these considerations, we argue that there is a high
probability that the efforts put forth during the Doha conference in
regard to pharmaceutical CLs will have a negligible long-term
impact on the regular use of CLs or on global access to
pharmaceuticals. This may be unsurprising given that TRIPS is
neither a health nor a pharmaceutical access framework, but a
trade framework. Nevertheless, health advocates who pushed for
the Doha Declaration reforms have had far less success in
engaging trade as a positive, proactive force for addressing health
gaps.
In closing, we note that while systematic impact evaluations
have gained wide acceptance in population health research, they
can be equally valuable at the global scale. There is a great need
for systematic evaluation of existing global health agreements,
treaties, and conventions. Such research could ultimately enhance
the impact of global health governance.
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Background. The development of a new drug is a time-
consuming and expensive process. To stimulate investment
in drug development, the creators of new drugs (including
the pharmaceutical companies that undertake the
development and testing that is needed before any drug
can be used in patients) can apply for ‘‘intellectual property
rights’’ (a patent). Intellectual property rights protect the
investments made by companies during drug development
by preventing other companies from making the new drug
for a fixed period of time and by providing a means by
which creators of new drugs can negotiate payment from
other companies for the use of their creation. Until recently,
the extent and enforcement of intellectual property rights
varied widely around the world. Then, in 1995, the World
Trade Organization (WTO) was established. By providing a
set of ground rules for trade among nations, the WTO aims
to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably, and
freely as possible around the world. One of the founding
documents of the WTO is the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement),
which attempts to bring the protection of intellectual
property rights (including patents) under common
international rules.
Why Was This Study Done? Unfortunately, patent
protection for drugs (pharmaceuticals) means that many
medicines are too expensive for use in developing countries.
While maintaining incentives for drug development, the
TRIPS Agreement allows governments to license the use of
patented inventions to someone else without the consent of
the patent owner. Such ‘‘compulsory licensing’’ normally
occurs only after negotiations for a voluntary license have
failed, and the patent owner still receives an appropriate
payment. It soon became clear that some governments were
unsure of their right to use compulsory licensing and other
flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement, a situation likely to affect
public health in poor countries by hindering universal access
to medicines. Consequently, the WTO issued the
‘‘Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health’’ at
its 4th Ministerial Conference in Doha in November 2001.
Reaction to the Doha Declaration, which reaffirms that the
‘‘TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent
members from taking measures to protect public health,’’
has been mixed. Some experts predicted that it would
increase compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals, but others
suggested that political pressure against compulsory
licensing and health system weaknesses in poor countries
would limit claims for compulsory licenses. In this database
analysis, the researchers systematically assess the impact of
the Doha Declaration on the compulsory licensing of
pharmaceuticals.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? By
systematically searching media archives for reports of WTO
member states considering or announcing compulsory
licensing of pharmaceuticals, the researchers identified 24
verified compulsory licensing episodes in 17 nations that
occurred between January 1995 and June 2011. Half of these
episodes ended with an announcement of a compulsory
license, and the majority ended in a price reduction for a
specific pharmaceutical product for the potential issuing
nation through a compulsory license, a voluntary license, or a
negotiated discount. Sixteen of the compulsory licensing
episodes involved drugs for HIV/AIDS, four involved drugs
for other communicable diseases, and four involved drugs
for non-communicable diseases such as cancer. More than
half the compulsory licensing episodes occurred in upper-
middle-income countries (including Brazil and Thailand).
Finally, most compulsory licensing episodes occurred
between 2003 and 2005. There was a smaller peak of
activity in the months leading up to the Doha conference,
but after 2006 activity declined substantially.
What Do These Findings Mean? Given these findings, the
researchers suggest that the Doha Declaration is unlikely to
have an important long-term impact on the use of
compulsory licensing or on access to pharmaceuticals for
communicable diseases other than HIV/AIDS in developing
and low-income countries. Most notably, the researchers
found no evidence of a spike in compulsory licensing
episodes immediately after the Doha Declaration, and they
note that the lagged spike that occurred between 2003 and
2005 could have resulted in large part from the global
antiretroviral advocacy campaign. Moreover, compulsory
licensing activity has diminished greatly since 2006. Thus,
the researchers conclude, health advocates who pushed for
the Doha Declaration reforms have had little success in
engaging trade as a positive, proactive force for addressing
health gaps.
Additional Information. Please access these websites via
the online version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pmed.1001154.
N The World Trade Organization provides information on
intellectual property rights, on the TRIPS Agreement, on
TRIPS and pharmaceutical patents, and on compulsory
licensing of pharmaceuticals and TRIPS (in English, French,
and Spanish); the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health is also available
N The World Health Organization provides information on
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health and an analysis of the implications of the Doha
Declaration
N Wikipedia has pages on intellectual property rights, on the
TRIPS Agreement, and on the Doha Declaration (note:
Wikipedia is a free online encyclopedia that anyone can
edit; available in several languages)
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